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ABSTRACT: It is usually taken for granted that the existence of water markets 
allows economic efficiency gains to be achieved at the expense of equity 
losses. This paper addresses the issue by analysing the functioning of the 
irrigation communities in pre-1950s eastern Spain. While in some of them the 
water inhered in the land and could not be sold, in others there were tradable 
water rights. In the paper it is shown that, in the former, not only was equity 
greater but in fact the resource was also used more efficiently. 
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RESUMEN: Es habitual dar por supuesto que la existencia de mercados del 
agua permite ganancias de eficiencia económica a costa de pérdidas de 
equidad. En este artículo se aborda la cuestión mediante el análisis del 
funcionamiento de las comunidades de regantes de la España del Este antes 
de la década de 1950. Mientras que en algunas de ellas el agua estaba ligada 
a la tierra y no podía ser vendida, en otras tanto el agua como los derechos 
sobre ella podían ser comprados y vendidos. En el artículo se muestra que en 
las primeras no sólo era mayor la equidad, sino que el recurso era utilizado de 
manera más eficiente. 
Palabras clave: mercados del agua, España, comunidades de regantes, 
eficiencia, equidad. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the last three decades the ideas that researchers and policy-makers 
previously held on water management in irrigated agriculture have been shaken by two 
major trends. On the one hand, the conviction that there is potentially room for a great 
deal of improvement if management is carried out by local communities has become the 
“new paradigm” (Kikuchi et al. 2001) and in many developing countries there has been 
a massive shift of the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of irrigation 
systems away from state agencies towards water-users’ associations (FAO 2004, 311-
317). On the other hand, there seems to be widespread agreement in favour of the need 
to adopt better water pricing policies, since underpricing of irrigation water is believed 
to be one of the main causes of water wastage. But no such agreement has been reached 
about which water pricing method ought to be used.1 
Many stress the advantages of water markets. Their main argument is that the 
allocation of water through competitive market pricing would make prices reflect its 
marginal value both for the buyer and for the seller, so that it would be continuously 
reallocated to higher-value uses.2 The irregularity and uncertainty that usually 
characterise surface water supplies, however, are complications that could prevent this 
from happening.3 
The market will lead a resource towards its highest-value uses if a series of 
conditions are fulfilled, which include the absence of externalities, well-defined 
property rights, many sellers and buyers, perfect information and perfect mobility. 
Because the water market does have externalities and often has few sellers, water is 
prone to market failure (Livingston 1995 and 1998). If in addition supplies are very 
irregular and unpredictable, the irrigator will have to make many of his farming 
decisions with little information about how much water will be available in the near 
future. Perfect mobility might not exist simply as a result of the losses that are always 
                                                            
1 Cumming and Nercissiantz 1992; Tsur and Dinar 1997; Perry et al. 1997; Johansson 2000; Johansson et 
al. 2002; Rogers et al. 2002; Molle and Berkoff 2007; De Fraiture and Perry 2007. 
2 Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Spulber and Sabbaghi 1994; Thobani 1997; Saleth and Dinar 2004; 
Bennet 2005. 
3 Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Beare et al. 1998; Livingston 1998; Bjornlund 2004; Hadjigeorgalis 
2004. 
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produced when water is transferred from one place to another, which may mean that it 
cannot be readily switched from one use to another. The more perfect the conveyance 
system is, the lesser the losses will be, whereas the greater the distance is, the higher the 
losses will be. If little water is available during a drought and the farms of those who 
would be willing to pay the highest price for it are a relatively long way away from each 
other, the water might not reach all of them just because it is physically impossible to 
take it there. Under such circumstances, is the market the best system for allocating the 
scarce resource? 
Are those problems solved better when the water is managed by irrigation 
communities? Are water markets compatible with the presence of irrigation 
communities? Using basically a priori reasoning, Mumme and Ingram (1985) and 
Young (1986) claimed that they are not, while Dudley (1992) and Rosegrant and 
Binswanger (1994) defended the opposite stance. But there have been few chances to 
test this in practice for one simple reason: to date, management by irrigators’ 
associations and the presence of water markets – as in Chile and Mexico – have seldom 
coincided (Molle 2009). 
 Pre-1950s eastern Spain is a very appropriate framework for the analysis of 
these questions for six reasons. First, the scarce and irregular rainfall and high summer 
temperatures of the region made it crucial to have a controlled supply of irrigation 
water. Second, the flow rate of the rivers was generally low and always very irregular (a 
problem that partially disappeared after the 1950s, when the construction of large dams 
started to become widespread). Third, the management of surface water was always 
performed by irrigation communities. Fourth, while in some communities there was 
appurtenance of water rights to land, the farmer could only use the water belonging to 
each piece of land to irrigate that particular piece of land and irrigating was very cheap, 
in other communities there was a water market and tradable water rights. Fifth, 
contemporary observers almost unanimously defended the apparently counterintuitive 
idea that water was used more efficiently when it was tied to the land. Lastly, in the 
1960s the two types of community were the subject of a comparative study by Maass 
and Anderson (1978), who came to the opposite conclusion. From then on, Maass and 
Anderson’s findings have frequently been cited to illustrate the advantages that can be 
gained from using the market as a tool to allocate water.4 Perhaps more important, 
Maass and Anderson’s book was also used by Elinor Ostrom (1990, 69-82) to obtain 
information about the irrigation communities in eastern Spain, and therefore to obtain 
empirical evidence on which to base her famous “principles” concerning the conditions 
for the success of common-pool resources in general (Ostrom 1990, 90-102) and of 
water resources in particular (Ostrom 1992, 67-76). 
                                                            
4 For example, Hearne and Easter 1995, 5; Howe 1997, 80; Lee and Jouravlev 1998, 21-22; Livingston 
1998, 21 and 23; Burns and Meinzen-Dick 2001, 5; Easter and Archibald 2002, 23; Easter and Lin 2005, 
13. 
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 In this paper Maass and Anderson’s theses will be discussed and, in doing so, 
the case of pre-1950s eastern Spain will be used to take a new look at an old topic, i.e. 
the relationship between efficiency (understood as the capacity to create wealth within a 
given resource base) and equity (which depends on how that wealth is distributed in 
society). As defended by Maass and Anderson, it will be shown that equity was greater 
in the irrigation communities that did not have tradable water rights. But something 
newer and more interesting will also be shown. The theoretical literature usually 
assumes that there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity (Msangi and Howitt 
2007 offers a recent example of this), something which has been confirmed by a large 
number of case-studies (Molle 2009; Shah et al. 2009). But some researchers have 
argued that this does not necessarily have to be the case. According to Samptah (1992, 
970), under certain conditions the promotion of efficiency can be compatible with 
improved equity, while policies introduced to promote equity have sometimes resulted 
in a simultaneous decrease in efficiency and equity. Others have claimed that the 
presence of water markets can lead to a reduction in rural poverty.5 Here it will be 
concluded that, in pre-1950s eastern Spain, both equity and efficiency were greater in 
the irrigation communities without a water market. 
Maass and Anderson considered that the irrigation communities of eastern Spain 
used three different systems to distribute the common water around the territory that had 
the right to be irrigated with it (which in Spanish is called the huerta). In this paper it 
will be assumed that there were only two such systems: the one used where there was 
no water market and that used where a water market did exist.6 In order to study the 
functioning of the latter, Maass and Anderson chose the case of the huerta of Alicante, 
where, according to them, the fact that the farmers with the highest-value uses for the 
water were able “to outbid others during all periods” allowed the water to be used more 
efficiently than in places where it could not be sold (1978, 139). However, these 
conclusions do not appear to be consistent with the quantitative information offered by 
the authors themselves. 
In 1964 the crop which provided the highest “full production net return/ha” in 
Alicante was the tomato, which allowed farmers to obtain 60,000 pesetas per year per 
hectare. So why were tomatoes only planted on 4.5 per cent of the huerta? (Maass and 
Anderson 1978, 144-145). If wheat and almonds only yielded 15,000 and 28,800 
pesetas per hectare, respectively, why did they take up 20.5 and 24.6 per cent of the 
                                                            
5 Fujita and Hossin 1995; Saleth 1998; Meinzen-Dick 1998; Rogers et al. 2002; Pant 2005; 
Narayanamoorthy 2007. 
6 Maass and Anderson distinguished between the turno (turn) procedure and the tanda procedure. With 
the former farms received water in a set rotation order and, when it was their turn to irrigate, the farmers 
could keep their headgates open for as long as they wanted, provided that the water was not wasted. The 
latter was also based on a set rotation order, but farmers could only withdraw water for a predetermined 
length of time, which was proportional to the area of their farms. In reality, the system used by nearly all 
the irrigation communities where the water inhered in the land was a mixture of the turno procedure and 
the tanda procedure (Garrido 2011). 
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irrigated area? In eastern Spain as a whole, the crop with the highest net return was the 
orange (80,000 pesetas per hectare, p. 99), which was the monoculture of most of the 
huertas without a water market (Garrido 2010a). Although its soil and climate were 
very well suited to growing oranges, yet on the huerta of Alicante there were no orange 
groves. Why not? 
 The search for an answer to these questions will serve as a thread connecting the 
four sections that make up the rest of the paper. The next section looks at the 
communities without a water market. Then the communities with a water market are 
examined. After that, the efficiency with which the water was used in each case is 
compared. Lastly, some conclusions are provided. 
 
II. COMMUNITIES WITHOUT A WATER MARKET 
 
 Throughout the nineteenth century the huertas in eastern Spain were visited by a 
number of engineers and geographers from France and the United Kingdom. Although 
some of them were very critical about the way the communities with a water market 
worked (Aymard 1864, 221-259; Brunhes 1902, 98-108), all of them praised the 
functioning of the communities in which the water inhered in the land. But what they 
said about the efficiency with which the resource was used in the latter appears to be 
contradictory. On the one hand, they said that very intensive farming was carried out in 
them and that a great deal of effort was made to ensure that no irrigators wasted water. 
“Nowhere in Valencia,” wrote for example C. S. Moncrieff (1868, 149), “did I see a 
flooded road. The watercourses were all neat ... The fields were everywhere clean and 
carefully terraced to receive the water...” They also pointed out, however, that the 
average discharge flow of their main canals would have allowed some communities to 
irrigate a much greater area than they actually did, which seems to suggest that, on a 
collective level, water was in fact wasted (Aymard 1864, 103; Roberts 1867, 27-28; 
Moncrieff 1868, 150 and 168). 
 To test whether it is true that such wastage did not exist on an individual level, I 
consulted the archives of the communities in Vila-real, Borriana and Castelló (all of 
which used the river Mijares), the archives of the Júcar Canal (which conveyed water 
from the river Júcar to 21 towns), and also several cadastres (padrones) of Alboraia (a 
town that was part of the huerta of Valencia and got its water from the river Turia) and 
of Gandia (whose huerta obtained its water from the river Serpis). 
Between 1870 and 1927 the community of Vila-real imposed 6,928 fines (an 
average of 121.5 per year) for offences against its Ordinances. If we bear in mind that in 
1900 the community was made up of 4,123 landowners and that the 2,224 hectares of its 
huerta were divided up into 10,412 parcels, 121.5 fines per year is a very small number. 
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Three reasons related to the prevention of wasting water (i.e. irrigating out of turn,7 
failing to clean the secondary canals,8 and not keeping watch over a field that was being 
irrigated) together accounted for 26 fines per year. But only five fines were issued per 
year for a non-preventive action that was also related with wastage of water, i.e. 
flooding fields against their owners’ will. 
If somebody irrigated their parcel too much, part of the water usually ended up 
flooding the lanes or (more likely) the neighbouring parcels. In contrast to what 
happened with the rest of the infractions (which were usually reported by people 
employed by the communities), those who flooded their neighbours’ fields were nearly 
always reported by the affected neighbours themselves. This behaviour was due to the 
fact that most of the crops grown on the huertas could not withstand excessive amounts 
of moisture, but also because unplanned irrigation upset the whole schedule of work to 
be done on the farm. 
Small farmers predominated on all the huertas and the typical farm consisted of 
a large number of scattered parcels. The main reason for the dispersion of the parcels, 
however, was not a wish to minimise the risk of the whole farm being affected by some 
meteorological disaster (which is the reason that is usually put forward to explain this 
kind of situation). Instead it was the result of a desire to optimise the use of the family 
workforce (Garrido and Calatayud 2010). If several scattered parcels were cultivated, it 
was relatively easy to ensure that irrigation was staggered. Since all farm work had to be 
stopped for several days after a plot had been watered, the labour demand was therefore 
more regular. This made it less necessary for farmers to work for other farmers on a 
daily wage basis at certain times, while also reducing the need to engage wage workers 
on other occasions.9 They were therefore highly motivated to report neighbours who 
flooded their fields, and the fact that so few cases were actually reported suggests that 
little water was wasted.10 
The same conclusion is also reached from another very significant indicator. If 
the practice of wasting water had been widespread, it is to be expected that those who 
did so most frequently would be the irrigators whose farms were located at the top-end 
of the canals (Bardhan 1984, 215; Ostrom 1995). If this were the case, there would be 
differences in the type of crops grown in the head-end and in the tail-end areas (because 
the former would tend to be more water-intensive), there would be differences in crop 
                                                            
7 If a farmer missed the chance to irrigate and later interrupted the flow of water to do so, all the water 
contained in the canal between this farmer's parcel and the last parcel that had been irrigated downstream 
would run towards the canal tail and, since nobody in particular was waiting for it, it could be lost. 
8 What usually happened in eastern Spain is that the main canals were cleaned by workers paid by the 
community, but the irrigators cleaned the stretches of secondary canals that ran alongside their farms. 
9 The scattering of parcels also meant that during droughts it was easier to reach an agreement between 
irrigators on how to share out the water (Wade 1988, 185; Garrido 2011), but that was just a by-product. 
10 The way fines were issued in Borriana (Garrido and Balaguer 2010) and Castellón (Glick 1970, 85-93) 
followed similar patterns to those of Vila-real. 
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intensities (at the tail-end a larger portion of the land would be left fallow every year) or 
both things would happen at the same time. However, none of this happened on the 
Júcar Canal, and in fact quite the opposite occurred: in 1845, almost half the area it 
irrigated was devoted to growing rice (and therefore had to be kept flooded for part of 
the year), but the towns where the cultivation of rice was most widespread were the 
ones located at the tail-end of the canal (Calatayud and Garrido 2010). On the huertas of 
Vila-real, Borriana, Castellón, Gandia and Alboraia no differences are observed 
between what was grown at each end of the canals.11 During a drought that occurred in 
1849, some tail-enders of the main canal in Vila-real protested about the criteria that 
had been adopted by the community for distributing the water, since, in their opinion, 
they went against the interests of farmers who were growing vegetables.12 The really 
significant thing about those complaints, however, is that they show that irrigators took 
it for granted that the tail-end fields could be planted with crops that consumed large 
amounts of water. The fact that the same crops could be cultivated all over the area 
served by an irrigation community was to become even more apparent as of the late 
nineteenth century, when it started to be more and more common to use both the head-
end and the tail-end water to irrigate the orange trees that were becoming the 
monoculture of the huertas. 
But was water wasted on a collective level? In the late 1920s the eight irrigation 
communities of the huerta of Valencia needed, as a whole, 196 hm3 of water a year 
(Bellver 1933, 27), which was much less than the 460 hm3 that, as an annual average 
over the period 1914-1950, the river Turia could have provided them with. Although 
this apparent wastage was partly a result of the inability to store water during the 
months in which consumption was lower (which were the ones in which the flow rate of 
the river was higher), Figure 1 shows how the consumption of the resource was below 
the average amount available even in the hot dry summer months. In Figure 2, however, 
it can be seen that the average amounts available are not really representative values, 
because in 15 Augusts over the period 1912-1950 the Turia carried less water than was 
considered necessary for this month in the late 1920s. When that happened, supplies 
were rationed, part of the harvest was lost and there was an increase in the number of 
conflicts among irrigators.13 
                                                            
11 In some communities, it was easier or harder for farms to irrigate depending on the canal they received 
their water from. For instance, because it had a poor supply of water, a small part of the huerta of 
Castellón contained only olive trees, which can resist long periods of drought, whereas in a privileged 
area of the huerta of Borriana they grew far more vegetables than in the neighbouring areas. Yet this did 
not happen because some farmers took more water than their due, but because the Ordinances stated that 
some areas of the huertas (usually the ones whose right to irrigate went back furthest in time) had the 
right to irrigate more often than others. 
12 Archive of the Community of Vila-real, Antecedentes-I, no. 42. 
13 Yet only the most severe droughts had disastrous repercussions on the huerta of Valencia, for only 
9,519 of its 16,058 hectares had full rights to irrigate from the Turia. Although the other 6,539 only had 
the right to irrigate when there were surpluses, they very often had access to supplementary water from 
shallow wells and small springs. 
7 
 
 
Figure 1. Water available and water needed on the huerta of Valencia 
Sources: http://hercules.cedex.es/anuarioaforos/afo/estaf-datos.asp?indroea=8022 (used to know the flow 
rate of the Turia) and Bellver (1933, 26-28). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Water available and water needed in August on the huerta of Valencia 
Sources: See Figure 1. 
 
 
 That situation was repeated in all the huertas without a water market. To 
illustrate this, Figure 3 and Figure 4 (which will be discussed below) show what 
happened on the huerta of Vila-real. This particular huerta was chosen for three 
reasons. First, because we have very complete information about what was cultivated on 
it over the years. Second, because (unlike what happened on the huerta of Valencia) in 
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Vila-real there were no areas that irrigated using surplus water.14 Third, because it was 
one of the first huertas in eastern Spain where the orange became a monoculture. 
 
Figure 3: Water available and water needed on the huerta of Vila-real 
Sources: Garrido (2004, 163) provides information about what was cultivated on the huerta of Vila-real, 
and Ministerio de Fomento (1918, I, 413-415) offers data about the amount of water needed by each crop. 
Information about the flow rate of the river Mijares from 1915 onwards can be consulted at 
http://hercules.cedex.es/anuarioaforos/afo/estaf-datos.asp?indroea=8005. The Vila-real weir diverted 
23.33 per cent of the river’s discharge, and I have considered that 30 per cent of that water was lost by 
evaporation and seepage. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Water available and water needed in August on the huerta of Vila-real 
Sources: See Figure 3. 
                                                            
14 In order to prevent the conflicts that flared during droughts, what usually happened was that the only 
areas that were allowed to irrigate with surplus water were those situated along the edges of the huertas 
that also had access to other water (coming from wells, etc.), and in Vila-real this last possibility did not 
exist. 
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 In a technical report from the early 20th century it was said that the part of the 
huerta of Valencia that irrigated using surpluses could take advantage of this right not 
only when the river Turia carried a large volume of water, but also “in normal years” 
(Ministerio de Fomento 1918, I, 375). If looked at the other way round, this statement 
meant that the territory with full irrigation rights comprised a smaller acreage than the 
part that could be irrigated with the average flow rate of the river. The same thing 
happened in practically all the communities where water was tied to the land because, in 
order to provide farmers with a reasonable degree of certainty that they would not lose 
their harvests during the frequent moderately dry years, the maximum limits of the 
huertas had been set taking into account the maximum acreage that could be irrigated in 
times of “ordinary low water”. 
If it is true that “uncertainty about the physical quantity of water available at 
particular times and locations impedes efficient resource use by lessening the expected 
value of engaging in water-related activities” (Livingstone 1998, 20), then the idea that 
constraining the size of the huertas was a means to enhance the creation of wealth no 
longer appears to be nonsense. 
 
III. COMMUNITIES WITH A WATER MARKET 
 
Good regulation can prevent ... the wastage of water; nothing can prevent the 
tragic consequences of an organisation that entrusts the fate of the land to 
capitalists whose interests run in the opposite direction to the development of the 
water sources. (Aymard 1864, 244) 
 
 Four types of arguments have been put forward to explain why ownership of the 
water was separated from that of the land in some irrigation communities. Maass and 
Anderson (1978) suggested that there was a cause-and-effect relation between the fact 
that water resources were especially scarce in some regions and the existence of this 
kind of separation.15 But this explanation is not sufficient. Most of the 35 or so 
communities with those characteristics were in very dry areas in the provinces of 
Alicante and Murcia. Yet they were also to be found in the comparatively wetter 
provinces of Valencia and Tarragona and in the rainy province of Girona, whereas the 
water always inhered in the land in the semi-arid province of Almeria.16 
                                                            
15 Many other authors have reached similar conclusions: due to the great expenses involved in 
establishing them, “water markets will only be active in regions with water scarcity” (Easter, Rosegrant 
and Dinar 1998, 280). 
16 The total number of communities with a water market mentioned by Lemeunier (1989, 10-11), Ferri 
(2002, 17) and López and Melgarejo (2007, 309) comes to 35. 
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 The second argument has its origins in Glick (1970, 213-215), who observed 
that both systems had a lot in common with two “irrigation models” used in the Islamic 
world. This leaves room for the possibility that the model adopted in each place by the 
Muslims while they occupied Spain would have continued to be used following the 
Christian conquest in the thirteenth century. Yet water and land were separated by the 
Christians in all the communities for which we have records describing their situation 
immediately after the conquest (Gil 1993; Barciela et al. 2004). 
 Third, because Alicante, Elche, Lorca, Elda, Petrel and Totana had small 
reservoirs and tradable water rights, other authors (Brunhes 1902, 95-108 and 427-429; 
Foster 1936, 65-66; and to a certain extent also Ostrom 1990, 92, and 1992, 51) have 
linked the presence of dams with the existence of water markets. But in actual fact these 
already existed before the dams were built. In Almansa, the first municipality in the area 
where a dam was constructed (in 1584), the water always continued to inhere in the 
land, whereas the irrigators of Alicante built a dam (the so-called Tibi Dam) in 1594 
with the aim of forcing the previously existing water market to vanish from their huerta. 
They did not succeed in their undertaking, but from then on half the water available was 
again tied to the land. 
 And fourth, most irrigators on the huertas with a water market thought that it 
was the largest landowners who, illegally and against the will of the majority, caused 
the water to be separated from the land.17 Thanks to the references made to it in the 
proceedings from a trial held in the early eighteenth century, we know that some of the 
people that enjoyed the greatest economic and political power in Puerto Lumbreras 
(province of Murcia) began to take possession of more water than their land was 
actually entitled to and to sell it through a spot market. Then a formal market appeared 
in which not only the water was tradable, but also the water rights (Gómez 2004). In 
Alicante or in Lorca something similar must have happened several centuries earlier 
(Altamira 1902; Musso 1847). After the formal water markets had been established, a 
group of large holders of water rights who owned relatively little land (or none at all) 
often came into being (Pérez-Picazo and Lemeunier 1990), because ownership of the 
water not only provided rents that were higher than those from the land (Alberola 1990), 
but also meant accepting lower risks in order to obtain them, as the demand for water 
was nearly always very high and the purchasers paid on the spot. As one specialist in 
irrigation matters from Lorca (who was also the owner of an important number of water 
rights) explained, wealthy owners “were better off selling the water of their land than 
using it to irrigate, and from there they went on to sell their land and to keep the water” 
(Musso 1847, 29). 
                                                            
17 This is mentioned in the first article of the Ordinances of Lorca (Ordenanzas de Lorca 1932, 18). Maass 
and Anderson acknowledged that, following the establishment of the water market, “the history of the 
Huerta of Alicante ... has been in some significant degree the history of unsuccessful efforts to reattach 
land and water” (1978, 100). 
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 From the point of view of the social interest, however, it is not clear that the 
change brought about good results, because the functioning of the water market was 
affected by three dysfunctions. 
 First, the sellers were interested in there being a rise in the demand. Increasing 
the size of the huertas was the easiest way to achieve this and as a result nearly all the 
huertas with a water market ended up being too large in relation to the amount of water 
available, in contrast to what occurred in the communities where the water was tied to 
the land.18 Thus, the little more than 0.25 m3/s supplied by the river Montnegre (which 
became 0.5 thanks to the Tibi Dam) were used in Alicante to irrigate 3,700 hectares, and 
in Elche 12,000 hectares were watered with about 1 m3/s.19 But it is important to keep in 
mind that what made the water/land ratio so low in these last communities was not the 
scarcity of water, but instead the use of the little water that was available to irrigate an 
area that was too large. Although it is possible that after the Christian conquest 
excessively large sizes were established for some huertas, and that this poor initial 
design acted as an incentive to set up water markets,20 the truth is that, almost as a rule, 
the area with the right to be irrigated experienced great increases following the 
introduction of water markets. The huerta of Lorca offers a good illustration of this. 
With a mean volume of 1 m3/s of water available, it initially comprised less than 5,000 
hectares (Manrique 1912, 350). It had a water market from the fourteenth century 
onwards and by the early sixteenth century it had already risen to 9,000 hectares 
(Hernández et al. 2002, 208). In the mid-nineteenth century the number had again 
increased to 11,000 (Musso 1847, 3), which went on to become 12,000 following the 
construction of a small dam in the 1880s (Manrique 1912, 350). 
It is sometimes taken for granted that “increased prices increase supply” (Rogers 
et al. 2002, 2), but the second dysfunction has to do with the fact that this did not 
happen in eastern Spain. Instead, the conclusion reached in an official report about 
Elche was that the owners of the water succeeded in keeping the amount on offer from 
increasing (Echevarría 1875, 247).21 In Alicante, the Tibi Dam was built against the 
wishes of the owners of the water, who were accused of being responsible for an 
important rupture that put it out of service for the next forty years in 1697 (Alberola 
                                                            
18 The cases of the Júcar canal and the river Mijares are good examples to illustrate the most common 
situation where water markets did not exist. The communities that used the Júcar canal (which carried a 
mean volume of about 20 m3/s) irrigated a total of 19,000 hectares in the late nineteenth century. With a 
“normal” flow rate of 10 m3/s, the river Mijares irrigated 10,000 hectares. 
19 Of course it was impossible to irrigate 12,000 hectares with 1 m3/s. What I mean is that altogether the 
surface area of the farms that were connected to the network of canals added up to a total of 12,000 
hectares.  
20 This is what happened again in Alicante following the construction of the Tibi Dam. As has already 
been said, from then on half the water available was attached to the land, but it was only enough to 
irrigate a tenth of each farm; as a result, the water attached to the land also ended up being used as a 
marketable commodity. 
21 Aymard (1864, 189) made some insightful reflections on the matter. 
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1990). It is also a well-documented fact that in Lorca the owners of the water objected 
not only to the building of dams but also to the sinking of wells (Hernández et al. 2002; 
Pérez-Picazo 2002). 
The third dysfunction is related to the upkeep and improvement of the system. It 
has often been observed that irrigators are unlikely to cooperate with one another in 
situations characterised by a great abundance or great scarcity of water (Wade 1994; 
Bardhan 2001; Araral 2009). In general, the communities without a water market 
managed to ensure that the size of their huertas was such that there were strong 
incentives to cooperate. But this did not occur in the communities with a water market, 
where the purchasers of the water did not usually make any kind of payment towards 
improvement and upkeep. The funds used in those operations normally came from two 
sources: the owners of the resource gave the community a percentage of the amount 
they obtained on selling it, and the community itself was the owner of a part of the 
volume of water and obtained a complementary income from selling it (Aymard 1864, 
177-178 and 187-188). The perversion of the system lay in the fact that: (a) because 
there was hardly any water to sell during heavy droughts, the community had no income 
with which to pay its employees; (b) when, from time to time, a flash flood damaged the 
derivation weirs and the first stretches of the main canal, the amount of water available 
was reduced and hence the income needed to carry out repairs also decreased; and (c) 
the initiatives put forward to increase the amount of water available on a permanent 
basis had to be funded by those who were not interested in this taking place, which 
therefore reinforced the second dysfunction. 
 
IV. COMPARING EFFICIENCY 
 
Nineteenth-century interpretations opposed “community” to “market”. Economic 
relations were non-commercial and non-progressive in the “community”, and the 
reverse with the “market”. The research of agricultural historians in the last fifty 
years has demolished this paradigm. (R. C. Allen 2001, 66) 
 
In the late nineteenth century, in Murcia (as in all the huertas without a water 
market) land was not usually left fallow and two successive crops were harvested every 
year. When wheat was grown, corn was then planted and altogether a net amount of 651 
pesetas per hectare per year was obtained. But wheat and corn were being grown on a 
relatively small portion of the huerta, “because the rest is used for cultivating 
vegetables, which are always more profitable” (Dirección General de Agricultura 1891, 
II, 416). 
Thanks to the increase in national and international demand for these kinds of 
products, both the growing on vegetables and oranges on a widespread basis was by 
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then becoming a very attractive option in eastern Spain. The farmers on the huerta of 
Valencia became specialised in the former and “frequently change[d] crops, depending 
on the prices that farm produce reach[ed] on the market” (Ministerio de Fomento 1918, 
I, 367). It was more common for the huertas without a water market, however, to 
specialise in the cultivation of orange trees, partly because they needed less water than 
vegetables. 
 Figure 3 shows the water needed on the huerta of Vila-real in 1821 and in 1907. 
In 1821, 70 per cent of the land was used to grow cereals and pulses, while another 20 
per cent contained trees and bushes (olive trees, carob trees and vines) that did not 
require much water. In 1907 orange groves covered 86 per cent of the area, while olive 
trees, carob trees and vines had completely disappeared. Although the farming was 
more intensive, thanks to the orange tree the overall water consumption remained 
similar to that of 1821. Furthermore, in Figure 4 it can be seen that, also thanks to the 
orange tree, in August (the month in which Spanish Mediterranean rivers undergo the 
greatest interannual variations in flow rate) water consumption was smaller in 1907 than 
in 1821, and in consequence there was less need to ration it. It was still necessary to 
resort to rationing on occasions, but although the orange harvest was affected by such 
shortages the trees survived. 
 At the same time, important social transformations were also taking place. In 
their analysis, Maass and Anderson (1978) set out from the assumption that the most 
efficient farms were the largest ones. According to their interpretation, water markets 
would have favoured those farms while penalising the small ones, and would therefore 
have allowed society to achieve efficiency gains in exchange for equity losses. 
However, the most efficient farms on the huertas were the ones that used essentially 
family labour (Garrabou 1985). It was for this reason that in the nineteenth century the 
large landowners usually had their estates worked by a large number of small tenants, 
who were often landless peasants (Garrido and Calatayud 2010). From the late 
nineteenth century onwards, it became usual for the tenants to acquire the ownership of 
the land they farmed (Calatayud 1989; Garrido 2010b), which they were able to do 
partly thanks to the complementary income that they, their wives and their children 
obtained from working for the orange export industry. 
 Where a water market existed, however, things were very different. There, 
growing cereals continued to be very important in the early twentieth century, the 
practice of leaving land fallow was still widely used and oranges and vegetables were 
hardly cultivated. In the social domain, in addition, water markets failed to satisfy the 
role that Thobani (1998, 47) attributes to them, i.e. “[They] help the poor by increasing 
employment opportunities resulting from more productive water use and increased 
investment in water-intensive activities”. 
 As a consequence of the disparity between the large surface area with a right to 
be irrigated and the little water that was available, it was impossible for all the farms to 
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irrigate every year. The 12,000 hectares of the huerta of Elche, for example, were 
irrigated using a rotation system in which half the territory was left fallow and “dry” 
every year (Echevarría 1875, 247). In Lorca cereals, which covered over 80 per cent of 
the huerta, were cultivated following a four-year crop rotation system consisting in 
wheat-wheat-barley-fallow. In each of the years in which wheat was sown, the net yield 
per hectare was 373 pesetas (Dirección General de Agricultura 1891, II, 448-449). But 
altogether the rotation yielded 867 pesetas per hectare, and therefore only 217 pesetas 
were obtained per hectare per year (that is, 867/4), which is a very small amount 
compared to the 651 pesetas that, as mentioned earlier, were obtained in Murcia. Of 
course, all this was reflected in the selling price and in the rent paid for the land: in the 
early twentieth century, the average rent per hectare was 70 pesetas in Lorca, 100 
pesetas in Alicante and 226 pesetas in Murcia (Ministerio de Fomento 1918, I, 446 and 
475). 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of water rotations delivered in Alicante and the minimum number of 
rotations needed by some crops (1914-1969) 
Source: For the number of rotations, Maass and Anderson (1978, 108-109). For the water needs, 
Ministerio de Fomento (1918, I, 443-445). 
 
 Since it was crucial to minimise the losses of water that took place during 
transport, the different areas of a huerta could only be irrigated at certain pre-
established times. In spite of the fact that the resource could be bought and sold, it was 
not possible to irrigate “on call”, in the strict sense of the term, on any of the huertas 
with a water market. In the case of Alicante, once the water had gone past the headgate 
of the farm on which the cycle began, a new rotation did not start until it had passed the 
headgate of the farm that finished the cycle. In theory, all the farmers could buy water 
every 23 days (and more often in times of abundance), which meant that they could 
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irrigate their land at least 15 times a year. Figure 5 shows how, in fact, there were 15 
years over the period 1914-1969 in which three or fewer water rotations were delivered. 
It can also be seen how the land could not have been used to cultivate vegetable 
rotations in any of the years under consideration, and if somebody had planted orange 
trees they would have lost the large investment needed to produce their groves, because 
orange trees would have died if they had only been irrigated once or twice for several 
years in a row. For this reason, the huerta of Alicante contained mainly “dryland” crops, 
such as cereals, almond trees or olive trees. In other words, they were crops that 
produced a larger harvest if they were irrigated, but could survive without being watered 
and always provided modest monetary returns in comparison to vegetables and oranges. 
 It must be noted that from the early twentieth century onwards the huerta of 
Alicante did not receive just the water from the Tibi Dam (which is the only water that 
has been considered in Figure 5), but could also use that which reached it (albeit in on a 
very irregular basis) thanks to a small transfer from the river Segura as well as some that 
came from wells. In an “average year” in the 1960s, the Tibi Dam provided 1.6 cubic 
hectometres and the huerta had a total of 5.35 cubic hectometres available, which 
Maass and Anderson (1978, 110) calculated as accounting for 23 per cent of the volume 
of water that would have been needed to be able to carry out intensive farming 
throughout the whole territory. This percentage was too small for anyone to risk 
planting orange trees. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Water availability and maximum number of times it was possible to irrigate 
per year on 9,700 hectares of the huerta of Lorca (1929-1947) 
Source: http://hercules.cedex.es/anuarioaforos/afo/estaf-datos.asp?indroea=7033, Dirección General 
de Agricultura (1891, II, 452-453), and Ministerio de Fomento (1918, II, 471-474). 
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 In Lorca the water market was regulated by a very different set of rules to those 
used in Alicante. Following the institution of a water market in the Middle Ages, the 
water continued to inhere in the land on about 20 hectares, which were used for the 
intensive cultivation of vegetables and fruit trees. Although they had to pay to be able to 
do so, the farmers of another 2,300 privileged hectares could irrigate their land quite 
frequently. But for the remaining 9,700 hectares on the huerta there was hardly any 
water left to be bought. Figure 6 shows that if all the farms located in this last area had 
been irrigated every year, in most of the years over the period 1929-1947 they would 
have received water on just one single occasion. What really happened was that, every 
year, a large percentage of the farms did not irrigate at all and this meant that the others 
could water their land three or four times. In any case, on both these 9,700 hectares and 
the 2,300 relatively “privileged” ones it was always impossible to carry out intensive 
farming.22 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In pre-1950 eastern Spain there were two types of irrigation communities: those 
in which the water was tied to the land and others in which there was a water market. In 
addition to producing lower equity, separating the ownership of the water from that of 
the land was also a less efficient system. As the nineteenth-century historian Pedro 
Díaz-Cassou put it, because water markets tended to generate “the paralysation of 
agricultural progress” (1889, 121). 
 Maass and Anderson performed a simulation of what would have happened on 
the 3,700 hectares of the huerta of Alicante if there had not been a water market. The 
conclusion they reached was that the economic results would have been worse. This 
conclusion is likely correct. The right question, however, was not the one that Maass 
and Anderson attempted to answer, but rather that of why the huerta of Alicante had 
3,700 hectares. That is, why it was so disproportionately large in relation to the amount 
of water available. Perhaps the great scarcity of water in absolute terms acted as a 
trigger for water markets to be established on some huertas. But in this paper it has been 
shown that, in the particular case of pre-1950s eastern Spain, not only were water 
markets unable to solve the problems arising from scarcity, but in fact they actually 
made them worse. 
 
 
                                                            
22 In the mid-1930s, the 20 hectares on which the water was tied to the land were sold for 24,000 pesetas 
per hectare, the 2,300 “privileged” hectares went at an average selling price of 4,700 pesetas per hectare, 
while the remaining 9,700 hectares were worth 1,750 pesetas per hectare (Elul 1946, I, 29). 
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